Culture vs Citizenship? A Review and Critique of Will Kymlicka’s *Multicultural Citizenship*

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The article presents a review and critique of Will Kymlicka’s *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. I focus primarily on the normative elements and consequences of Kymlicka’s theory and present an alternative to his liberal defence of group-differentiated rights. In marked contrast to Kymlicka, I argue that to truly protect their cultures minority groups must forge closer ties with their respective states. Furthermore, I suggest that multicultural citizenship can only be achieved through a commitment by both majority and minority groups to toleration and respect for deep diversity. To be effective, multiculturalism should be considered to be an ordering principle of the regime.

Introduction

The need to foster stability and cohesion in multiethnic states has taken on a measure of urgency since the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the proliferation of violent ethnic conflicts throughout the world. Finding the means of accommodating mass immigration, meeting the demands of national minorities and fostering civic responsibility through citizenship has proven to be problematic, both for political theorists and liberal democratic regimes. In his recent book, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (1995), Will Kymlicka presents a comprehensive argument in favour of recognizing and ensuring the survival of minority groups in accordance with liberal theories of justice, as advanced by John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and John Stuart Mill. While the views presented in this review are critical of many of the arguments and prescriptions presented in *Multicultural Citizenship*, we should recognize the value of Kymlicka’s work, particularly in terms of its scope and clarity. His formulation of a decidedly liberal approach to minority rights establishes a useful starting point for further theorizing on the subject.

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This article analyzes Kymlicka's theory of minority rights through a close reading of *Multicultural Citizenship*. To begin with, I summarize Kymlicka's arguments in favour of minority rights. Implicit in this account is an analysis of his peculiar conception of liberal autonomy and culture. Following this, I point out that his theory does not protect minority cultures from threats arising out of mass culture in the 'global marketplace'. I conclude by noting that national minorities may be defended from this and other threats through a different theory of minority rights. In doing so, I sketch an alternative to the liberal framework for defending the culture of national minorities.

**Freedom and Culture: Kymlicka's Liberal Defence of Group Differentiated Rights**

In much of his recent work, Kymlicka has attempted to advance a strong defence of group-differentiated rights in a manner consistent with liberal theories of justice. His motivation stems partly from the fact that few of his contemporaries have addressed the issues surrounding multiculturalism in a substantive manner (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 49). In Chapter 5 of *Multicultural Citizenship*, Kymlicka proposes an entirely new liberal framework for considering the claims of ethnic and national minorities. He begins by noting that liberals can only endorse minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy of individuals (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 75). Hence, his theory must promote and be consistent with individual freedom. Freedom, however, is linked with the individual's functioning in a particular form of culture: a 'societal culture'. Societal cultures provide meaningful ways of life across a full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. They also tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language. According to Kymlicka, "... in the modern world, for a culture to be embodied in social life means that it must be institutionally embodied—in schools, media, economy, government ..." (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76).

Consequently, the criteria required for designation as a societal culture excludes immigrant groups, for they have left behind the institutional practices which provided culturally significant ways of life in their original homelands (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 77). Conversely, groups possessing a societal culture have been incorporated into the larger polity through conquest, colonization, or federation. As such, these groups possess a 'homeland'. This is a critical distinction in that:

> these groups have fought to retain their existence as distinct societal cultures ... The determination they have shown in maintaining their existence as distinct cultures, despite ... enormous economic and political pressures [to assimilate], shows the value they attach to retaining their cultural membership. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 79).

Based on this distinction between societal cultures and immigrant groups, Kymlicka proposes that we accord each group specific rights. Immigrant groups may be granted *polyethnic rights* which facilitate their assimilation into the
majority culture while encouraging the maintenance of some aspects of ethnic particularity (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 78–9). Societal cultures, on the other hand, require a stronger form of group rights which may include self-government rights and special representation rights (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 27–33). The remainder of this article will be devoted to Kymlicka's treatment of societal cultures.

Clearly, the most controversial group-differentiated right is that of self-government, for Kymlicka must defend it with reference to liberalism's commitment to individual autonomy. In other words, he must defend group-differentiated rights against the liberal charge that they deny the primacy of the individual. Before delving into how Kymlicka solves this apparent dilemma, we need to further examine his understanding of liberalism and individual freedom.

Kymlicka notes that liberalism's defining feature is that it grants people a wide freedom to choose how to lead their lives. For liberals, the ability to revise the ends of one's life is a fundamental feature of this freedom, for 'it allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life' (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 80). The ability to choose one's lifeplan is important because 'it is implausible to think that someone can lead a better life against the grain of his profound ethical convictions than at peace with them' (Dworkin, 1989, p. 486).

Thus, Kymlicka cites two preconditions liberals demand for leading a good life. The first is to lead one's life from the inside, armed with the liberties and resources needed to lead life in accordance with one's beliefs about value, without fear of discrimination or punishment (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81). This precondition explains the traditional liberal concern for individual privacy and opposition to the enforcement of morals. The second precondition is that one must be free to question his or her beliefs; to examine them in light of whatever information, examples and arguments their culture can provide. Individuals must have the conditions necessary to acquire an awareness of different views of the good life, and an ability to examine these views intelligently. 'Hence the equally traditional liberal concern for education, and freedom of expression and association. These liberties enable us to judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of life' (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81). Thus, the key to liberal society lies in its allowing people to pursue their ways of life while also giving them access to information about other ways of life through freedom of expression. Indeed, as Kymlicka points out, it requires children to learn about other ways of life through mandatory education and makes it possible for people to engage in radical revision of their ends without legal penalty (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 82).

Kymlicka ties the value of individual freedom to membership in a societal culture in a novel manner. In his own words, '... freedom involves making choices among various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us' (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 83). Choices about social practices, in Kymlicka's view, are based upon one's belief about the value of these practices. However, to have a belief about one's practices is in turn a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by his or her culture. Understanding the meaning of social practices requires an understanding of the culture's shared vocabulary, which is embodied in its language and history:
The way in which language renders vivid these activities is shaped by our history, our 'traditions and conventions'. Understanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of making intelligent judgements about how to lead our lives. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 83)

Thus, the value of a culture is understood only with reference to its role in providing the individual with a range of meaningful options. This is the key to Kymlicka's liberal defence of group-differentiated rights.

For meaningful individual choice to be possible, individuals need not only access to information, the capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and freedom of expression and association. They also need access to a societal culture. Group differentiated measures that secure and promote this access may, therefore, have a legitimate role to play in a liberal theory of justice. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 84)

Kymlicka is aware that his theory is open to challenge from cosmopolitan liberals such as Jeremy Waldron, who argue that societal cultures need not be limited to ethnic groups or nationalities (Waldron, 1992, pp. 751–93). He counters this assertion by arguing that abandoning one's culture for a cosmopolitan lifestyle is more difficult than Waldron admits, although the reasons for one's attachment to his or her culture are complex and cannot be gauged with precision. Through the example of the Canadian Quebecois, Kymlicka points out that even cultures that have been liberalized continue to prize their particularity. Moreover, cultural membership not only provides for meaningful options, it also plays an important role in forming one's identity. According to Kymlicka, 'cultural identity provides an “anchor for [people’s] self-identification and the safety of effortless belonging” ... this in turn means that people's self-respect is bound up with the esteem in which their national group is held' (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 89). Thus, one's dignity and self-respect is tied to the status of his or her culture. One might therefore assume that membership in a societal culture is not enough to ensure an individual's freedom, for if his or her culture is derided, the individual's self-esteem will also be violated. This introduces a rather interesting twist to the discussion; for if a healthy identity is one of the benefits derived from membership in a societal culture, it follows that membership in a detested societal culture would be harmful to its members' self-respect. Interestingly, Kymlicka does not pursue this point further, despite the important questions it raises.

A strong attachment to one's own culture would seemingly conflict with the liberal's emphasis on freedom of choice. Not so, says Kymlicka. In fact, 'the freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the freedom to go beyond one’s language and history, but rather the freedom to move around within one's societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which features of the culture are worth developing, and which are without value' (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 90–1, emphasis added). Kymlicka argues that despite his emphasis of the value of one’s particular societal culture, his theory is liberal and not communitarian. This is because the individual possesses
the means of revising his or her ends and is given the right to do so. This differs from the communitarian position which seeks to promote a politics of the common good, even if it limits the ability of individual members to revise their ends. According to Kymlicka, '[t]he liberal view I am defending insists that people can stand back and assess moral values and traditional ways of life, and should be given not only the legal right to do so, but also the social conditions which enhance this capacity (e.g. a liberal education)' (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 92).

What is peculiar about this argument is that it appears to limit individuals to the options available within their societal culture. Access to a range of life plans is limited to those of the individual's societal culture. We are therefore left with a truncated conception of autonomy. In Kymlicka's own words:

[L]iberal society is a society of free and equal individuals. But what is the relevant 'society'? For most people it seems to be their nation. The sort of freedom and equality they most value, and can make most use of, is freedom and equality within their own societal culture ... they are willing to forgo a wider freedom and equality to ensure the continued existence of their nation. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 93, emphasis added)

The fact that this statement is presented in the guise of an empirical observation should not obscure its normative implications. For it is the only way that Kymlicka's harmonizing of individual autonomy and group differentiated rights makes sense. The individual's ability to revise his or her ends is limited to the resources made available by his or her culture. The liberal defence of group-differentiated rights, therefore, relies on a purposely limited conception of autonomy.

[W]e have a choice, on the one hand, [of] increased mobility and an expanded domain within which people are free and equal individuals, and, on the other hand, decreased mobility but a greater assurance that people can continue to be free and equal members of their own national culture. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 93)

What we are left with is a theory of multiculturalism that appears to limit the possibility of shared values and individual freedom across societal cultures. By confining the individual's freedom to within his or her societal culture, Kymlicka is in fact affirmin[ing] one of the central communitarian critiques of liberalism. That is, that deontological liberalism and its claim to invariant principles of justice is flawed. For, according to Kymlicka's own theory, the norms of actual communities (Sittlichkeit) are more important than abstract, universal principles (Morality) (O'Neill, 1988).

The implications of Kymlicka's theory are even more dramatic when we refer to his earlier comments regarding the value of freedom. Again, according to Kymlicka, liberalism's defining feature is that it grants people a wide freedom to choose how to lead their lives. The reader is justified in asking 'How wide is this freedom when according to Kymlicka's own theory, meaningful options are derived solely from societal cultures?' By concluding that 'cultures or nations are the basic units of political theory,' and arguing that freedom and equality
really amounts to freedom and equality within one’s societal culture, Kymlicka seems to endorse the isolation of societal cultures. This is a paradoxical proposition, for it appears that, according to Kymlicka, liberal values are satisfied so long as individuals have the ability to revise their life plans through the limited resources of their societal culture.

Kymlicka is aware of this criticism and responds to it by agreeing that ‘[l]iberals cannot endorse a notion of culture that sees the process of interacting with and learning from other cultures as a threat to their “purity” or “integrity”, rather than as an opportunity for enrichment’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 102). Moreover:

[L]iberals want a societal culture that is rich and diverse, and much of the richness of a culture comes from the way it has appropriated the fruits of other cultures ... we do not want to build closed walls around cultures, to cut them off from ‘the general movement of the world’. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 102)

But if liberals are against building walls around cultures, why should they endorse group-differentiated rights? Kymlicka answers this question by arguing that the options derived from a diverse array of cultural materials are accessible only once they have become part of a societal culture's shared vocabulary of social life—that is, once they have become embodied in the social practices, based on a shared language, that all the group’s members are exposed to. Group-differentiated rights such as self-government allow societal cultures to interact with larger nations on a more equitable basis. Kymlicka argues that groups themselves should be able to decide when and how they will adopt the achievements of the larger world (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 104). They demand the right to decide for themselves what aspects of the outside world they will incorporate into their cultures. Conversely, ‘[i]t is right and proper that the character of a culture change as a result of the choices of its members’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 105). Thus, cultures are entitled to protection from threats beyond their territory but are open to change from within.

Group-differentiated rights—such as territorial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims and language rights—allow for equality between societal cultures (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 109). Equality ensures that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as distinct cultures, if they so choose (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 113). Kymlicka argues that the principle of fairness should compel the majority nation to allow minorities to receive protection for their language and culture. In this sense, self-government rights:

... compensate for unequal circumstances which put members of minority cultures at a systemic disadvantage in the cultural marketplace, regardless of their personal choices in life ... Once the societal cultures of national groups are protected, through language rights and territorial autonomy, then the cultural marketplace does have an important role to play in determining the character of the culture. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 113)
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The principle of fairness noted above is one of the key elements distinguishing Kymlicka's theory from that of fellow liberal Chandran Kukathas. Kukathas holds that the protection of minority communities need not entail the wholesale reinterpretation of liberal theory to justify group-differentiated rights (Kukathas, 1992, p. 107). In Kukathas' words: '[w]e need, rather, to reassert the fundamental importance of individual liberty or individual rights and question the idea that cultural minorities have collective rights' (Ibid.). Kukathas' alternative proposal is based primarily on the right of individuals to freely 'form communities and to live by the terms of those associations' (Kukathas, 1992, p. 116). This reinvigorated freedom of association is matched by the individual's right to exit the community when its way of life is no longer acceptable to him or her (Ibid.). A community's link to the 'mainstream' society need not extend beyond its agreement to honour its members' right of exit. Indeed, groups may be 'illiberal' in so far as Kukathas allows them to restrict their members' individual rights with impunity (Kukathas, 1992, p. 133).

In his initial response to Kukathas, Kymlicka argued that Kukathas' theory betrays liberalism's deep commitment to personal liberty (Kymlicka, 1992, p. 143). His emphasis on the principle of fairness in Multicultural Citizenship broadens this critique inasmuch as it takes the history and quality of minority/majority relations into consideration. Kukathas' theory fails to recognize both the legacy of wrongs suffered by minority groups at the hands of majorities and the typically subservient position of minorities vis a vis mainstream societies. Conversely, the principle of fairness justifies giving special rights to minority communities; these rights, in turn, can only be properly understood as belonging to the group. The individual right to association and exit leaves no room for either the redress of past wrongs or the cultivation of more equitable relations between groups in the future.

The Threat of Mass Culture in the 'Global Marketplace'

While Kymlicka's argument is indeed consistent with his understanding of liberal principles, it still fails to recognize an important threat to minority cultures. In a world where television sets and satellite dishes are common in cosmopolitan cities and traditional villages alike, any notion of limiting the rate of modernization seems anachronistic. As the President of the Motion Picture Association of America put it, '[s]ome people don't understand. When you can hurl down programs from a satellite with the speed of light to 3.5 billion people simultaneously you live in a global marketplace. You can't fence off your borders ... It is a worldwide marketplace' (Dunne, 1995, p. 3). In light of the difficulties both France and Canada have had protecting their cultural identity from Hollywood's encroachments, it seems futile to believe that self-government rights alone will allow national minorities to maintain their societal cultures. Under modern conditions, minority cultures need more than self-government rights, they require the assistance of the state to acquire the means of protecting their culture. For example, government subsidies may be essential for cultural productions (plays, concerts), the teaching of minority languages and the establishment of forms of media (newspapers, radio stations, television channels) that serve the needs of
minority communities. To be effective, assistance must go beyond the conferring
of self-government rights. Minority cultures must be given a greater voice in the
affairs of national governments to ensure that their needs are met. Giving
cultures the right to isolation is insufficient when we consider the threat posed
by the homogenizing power of mass culture. Moreover, many of our most
pressing problems transcend borders and cultures. In their study of aboriginal
self-government in Canada, Roger Gibbins and J. Rick Ponting point out that:

... no matter what the self-governing status of aboriginal commu-
nities, the residents of such communities will continue to have an
interest, and a stake in the affairs of the federal government. There is no reason to assume, for example, that aboriginal Can-
adians will be any less interested than other Canadians in acid rain,
the health of the national economy, and arms control. The
argument can therefore be made that aboriginal Canadians would
want the opportunity to participate in national affairs as individu-
als and as Canadian citizens, and would not want to have
their right to participate circumscribed or delimited by their
aboriginal status. (Gibbins and Ponting, 1986, p. 207)

This argument is echoed in a statement in favour of entrenched Parliamentary
representation for Native peoples, made by the Native Council of Canada
in 1983:

Full citizens cannot simply be the passive objects of policy; their
full participation in the policy-making process is required. It is
this need which the demand for a constitutionally entrenched
block of seats for Native peoples in Canada’s Parliament and
provincial legislatures is designed to meet. Only thus can their
participation be assumed in the resolution of their social and
political dilemmas arising from their ambiguous social status and
spatial characteristics. (Gibbins and Ponting, 1986, p. 227)

Kymlicka rejects this argument, and presents quite a different reading of the
aspirations of minority cultures. He argues that demands for self-government
reflect a desire to weaken the bonds between minority cultures and the larger
political community (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 181). Thus he sees little hope for a
common bond of citizenship joining members of minority cultures to the larger
political community. Despite this, Kymlicka does recognize that there has to be
some basis for accommodation in multination states (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 186).
He concludes that ‘[p]eople from different national groups will only share an
allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as a context within which their
national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 189).
He therefore affirms the need for what Charles Taylor calls a theory of ‘deep
diversity’ (Taylor, 1990, p. 75), ‘since we must accommodate not only a diversity
of cultural groups but also a diversity of ways in which the members of these
groups belong to the larger polity’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 189). However, Kymlicka
rejects Taylor’s belief that citizens in a multiethnic state would find it worthwhile
to build a society founded on deep diversity. Instead, he is left wondering
why citizens would find this exciting rather than wearying, given the endless negotiations and complications it entails (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 190).

I have noted more than one answer to this question. The challenges posed by mass culture, ecological destruction and threats of violence from beyond national borders confront both minority and majority cultures. Moreover, minority cultures depend on their state's governments for financial assistance and other means of support (Gibbins and Ponting, 1986, p. 178). Thus, the benefits of working together are compelling. However, the question remains: How do we instill greater stability and cooperation in multination states?

Citizenship and Minority Cultures: A Brief Sketch

Perhaps the answer to this question is precisely the one Kymlicka discards, namely, a common citizenship for members of both minority and majority cultures. Kymlicka rejects common citizenship on the grounds that it demeans the status of minority cultures and affirms the dominance of the majority group. He believes that 'a regime of common citizenship means that the minority has no way to limit its vulnerability to the economic and political decisions of the majority, since the boundaries and powers of internal political units are defined to suit the administrative convenience of the majority, not the self-government claims of the minority' (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 183). However, these problems are precisely of the type that call for greater participation. For only through direct dialogue with the majority can minority groups hope to voice their concerns and aspirations. Isolation, once again, is not an option. In fact, Kymlicka admits that a highly effective brand of citizenship is necessary in order for a liberal multicultural state to function smoothly (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 175).

How then do we reconcile group-differentiated rights with shared citizenship across cultures? Perhaps the answer lies in our conception of the proper role of government. Remember that Kymlicka bases much of his discussion on a thin theory of justice, as advanced by Rawls and Dworkin. In short, he rejects the notion that a society may be defined by its adherence to a common conception of the good (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 92) But what if the common conception of the good is founded, in part, on the values and ends he is advocating? Would not the lofty goals he has in mind be easier to reach if the institutions and functions of the regime were based on a recognition and sanctioning of 'deep diversity'?

Kymlicka would probably reject this argument because it sanctions a particular conception of the good. Recall that his defence of group-differentiated rights is limited to guaranteeing individuals the option of leading their lives from the inside and revising their life plans as they see fit. The character of a culture, the array of peculiar features which make it special to its members, is deemed unimportant. Membership in a societal culture, presumably even one stripped of its traditions and customs, is all that is required in order to satisfy the core provisions of his theory. In essence, Kymlicka has built an elaborate structure on what some would consider to be the flimsiest of human aspirations. A liberal defence of multiculturalism necessarily advocates a liberal way of life. It is not difficult to see why this may not capture the 'hearts and minds' of the very groups it aims at defending. For, 'the liberal way of life, upheld by a particular
dispensation, a particular ethos, is one where the liberal self draws its constitutive identity from its capacity to choose autonomously how and where it will work, who it will marry, what it will be. This way of life is centred on choice, mobility, and maximal personal freedom' (Beiner, 1992, p. 32). These goals, worthy though they may be, do not, it seems capture the demands of national minorities battling the assimilative threat of mass culture. In point of fact, many groups view liberalism itself as a threat to the survival of their culture, not a means of ensuring its flourishing. In the words of one Canadian Native group:

The value system of the dominant socio-cultural system in Canada is liberalism which places emphasis on the individual, individual rights and private property. This is in contrast to the value system of Native peoples which places a far higher value on the collectivity or upon the community. It is ironic that non-Native Canadians, with all their liberal ideological baggage, cannot understand the significance to the Native peoples, or for that matter to any self-conscious minority group, of being recognized as a collectivity. They do not realize that a cultural minority faces certain death by assimilation if the political system forces it to deal with the majority culture as individuals. (emphasis added, Gibbins and Ponting, 1986, p. 216)

In light of this and similar criticisms, a defence of group differentiated rights based on deep diversity must recognize that minority nations do wish to maintain the character of their societal cultures. An alternative to the liberal defence of group-differentiated rights would therefore require that the regime be committed to nurturing the ideal of diversity and respect for all societal cultures. This could only be achieved through the consent and co-operation of its citizens through their commitment to shared ends. Thus, multicultural citizenship would be based on a commitment of all citizens to diversity. This form of multiculturalism would have to be based on a particular conception of the good, one that formally recognized respect for all cultures as an ordering principle of the regime. It might be modeled after what Martha Nussbaum refers to as a thick/vague conception of the good:

... is not 'thin' like Rawl's 'thin theory'—that is, confined to the enumeration of all-purpose means to good living, but 'thick'—dealing, that is, with human ends across all areas of human life. The conception is, however, vague ... It admits, that is, of many concrete specifications; and yet draws the general outlines of the target, so to speak ... in the vague guidance it offers, though, it does real work. (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 217)

Such a conception of the good is based on an 'ethical-political account given at the very basic and general level ... one that can be expected to be broadly shared across cultures, providing a focus for an intercultural ethical-political inquiry' (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 206). Given that most individuals prize their societal culture, their agreement to a set of principles enabling them to protect its character, while not trespassing on the individual rights of members, should be possible. Thus,

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though citizens would be dissimilar in terms of their culture, preservation of the partnership would serve as their common task. Hence, the virtue of the citizen would necessarily be with a view to the regime. Multicultural citizenship would be bound to an ethos grounded in mutual respect for all societal cultures. Therefore, it would be regarded as an asset regardless of one’s cultural identity.

Conclusion

The alternative framework sketched out above simply aims at highlighting some elements of Kymlicka’s theory which may need further refinement. The most important of these regards the possibility of shared citizenship in a multinational state. It is important not only because of its theoretical challenge, but also because of its relevance to current political crises. For if one cuts to the heart of many ethnic conflicts, what is at stake is the ideal of a shared citizenship that transcends ethno-cultural differences. Kymlicka’s liberal theory of multiculturalism, in its present form, does not provide us with a comforting solution to this question. Perhaps, as I have attempted to point out, the solution lies somewhere outside of contemporary liberal theory. Only further reflection on this important question will yield further insights, and possibly a more satisfying answer.

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